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Book Review 
SOME THOUGHTS AND TRUTHS ABOUT 
IMMIGRATION MYTHS:  THE “HUDDLED 
MASSES” MYTH:  IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS†  
By Harvey Gee* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As an avid reader of Kevin R. Johnson’s previous legal writings 
about race and immigration, I was extremely pleased to find his most 
recent book, The “Huddled Masses” Myth:  Immigration and Civil Rights 
(“Huddled Masses”) resting on the shelf in the law books section of the 
San Diego Border’s bookstore.1  Johnson, a prolific writer, is a member of 
the Critical Race Theory Movement.  For those readers unfamiliar with 
the Critical Race Theory Movement, it is a school of legal thought that 
functions as an alternative approach to addressing race jurisprudence.  
Critical Race Theory scholars, most of whom are racial minorities 
situated in the nation’s legal academies, seek to challenge the ways in 
which race and racial power are constructed and represented in 
American legal culture and society.2  Their scholarship offers racial 
minorities an opportunity to add a distinct perspective to legal 
scholarship by revealing the viewpoints of those who have been 
historically subjected to social domination and subordination.3  Critical 
Race Theory scholars question the traditional assumptions of both 
                                                 
†  KEVIN. R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
254 (2004). 
*  Law Clerk to the Honorable Michael J. Watanabe, United States District Court for the 
District of Colorado; Adjunct Instructor, University of Colorado; LL.M, The George 
Washington University Law School; J.D., St. Mary’s University School of Law; B.A., 
Sonoma State University.  I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Valparaiso Law 
Review for their hardwork and comments on this book review. 
1 KEVIN. R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 
254 (2004). 
2 See Harvey Gee, Beyond Black and White: Selected Writings by Asian Americans Within the 
Critical Race Movement, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 759, 764 (1999) [hereinafter Beyond Black and 
White]; see also Harvey Gee, Changing Landscapes: The Need for Asian Americans to Be Included 
in the Affirmative Action Debate, 32 GONZ. L. REV. 621, 642-44 (1996) [hereinafter Changing 
Landscapes]. 
3 Beyond Black and White, supra note 2; Changing Landscapes, supra note 2. 
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liberals and conservatives with respect to the goals and means of 
traditional civil rights reforms.4  
Johnson’s Huddled Masses is much more theoretical in comparison to 
his first book, How Did You Get to Be Mexican?:  A White/Brown Man’s 
Search for Identity,5 which was an autobiographical essay articulating his 
experiences negotiating the color-line between white and brown.  In 
Johnson’s first book, he explored his primary argument:  Because 
America is far from being a color-blind society, an individual’s race 
greatly influences his or her life experiences and probably his or her 
place in society. 
In Huddled Masses, Johnson, Associate Dean and Professor of Law in 
Chicana/o Studies at the University of California, Davis, is much more 
consistent with his earlier work.  In Huddled Masses, Johnson again writes 
broadly and frankly about the intersection of race and the law.  The focus 
this time is U.S. immigration law and civil rights.  Huddled Masses is a 
fascinating and important volume, which divides itself into eight 
succinct chapters.  The first chapter discusses immigration and civil 
rights in the United States.  Next, chapters two through five share the 
common theme of addressing the exclusion and deportation of racial 
minorities, political undesirables, the poor, and criminals.  Chapter six 
then analyzes the marginalization of women under the immigration and 
nationality laws.  Chapter seven examines the exclusion and deportation 
of lesbians and gay men.  The book closes with Johnson’s perspective on 
the future of immigration and civil rights in this country.  Each section is 
concise, and each chapter logically leads into the next part.  This 
organization allows the reader to skip to sections of particular interest.  
Johnson’s expressed intent was to write his book for a general audience, 
and for the most part, he succeeds.  
Huddled Masses is timely.  Recently, the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights heard reports and allegations of abuses by U.S. Border Patrol 
Agents against indigenous peoples along the international border.6  
These incidents include harassment, intimidation, and racial profiling.7  
Further north, in Denver, a citizens group by the name “Defend 
                                                 
4 Beyond Black and White, supra note 2; Changing Landscapes, supra note 2. 
5 KEVIN R. JOHNSON, HOW DID YOU GET TO BE MEXICAN?: A WHITE/BROWN MAN’S 
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (1999). 
6 Brenda Norrell, Civil Rights Commission Hears Indigenous Peoples at Mexican Border, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 29, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 12397482. 
7 See Lynn Bartels, Group Seeks Action on Illegal Immigration; Defend Colorado Now Weighs 
Ballot Initiative, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 5, 2004, at 20A. 
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Colorado Now” is frustrated with what they perceive to be an illegal 
immigration problem out of control.  The group is considering a 2006 
ballot initiative that will prevent undocumented immigrants from 
receiving government services.8  Against this type of contemporary anti-
immigrant sentiment, Johnson starts by looking back in time to address 
this country’s lengthy history of excluding and deporting the immigrant 
poor.9  His survey begins with the early days of this nation’s history, 
when restrictions were imposed for the purpose of limiting immigration 
of potential benefit recipients, and it ends with the efforts of the federal, 
state, and local governments to substantially restrict immigration during 
the late twentieth century.10  
With an almost cliché statement, Johnson explains that the United 
States accepts many more immigrants than most nations, admitting 
hundreds of thousands each year.11  However, another aspect of U.S. 
immigration history is a source of shame to those committed to equality 
under the law.12  Contrary to popular beliefs, a review of American 
history actually reveals a lack of U.S. openness to and acceptance of the 
“huddled masses”—the “tired” or the “poor.”  Here lies the 
straightforward premise of Huddled Masses: 
[T]he U.S. immigration laws and their enforcement have 
barred racial minorities, political dissidents, the poor, 
actual and alleged criminals, and homosexuals from our 
shores and—often pursuant to procedures that are 
difficult, if not impossible, to square with the notion of 
due process of law—have caused them to be deported 
from the country.13  
Johnson builds on the common argument that U.S. immigration laws 
have been discriminatory, writing, “[Historically], the United States has 
sought to exclude those categories of immigrants who share common 
characteristics with groups that are disfavored in this country.”14  
Despite the nation’s egalitarian pronouncements, many notable episodes 
in U.S. history demonstrate harsh treatment of its minority citizens.  
Johnson proceeds to cite a few well-known examples:  “The segregation 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 92. 
10 Id. at 94. 
11 Id. at 1. 
12 Id. 
13 See id. at 2. 
14 Id. 
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of [African American] and white children in schools, the genocide of 
Native American peoples, the internment of Japanese Americans during 
World War II, and the deportation of Mexican American citizens during 
the Great Depression.”15   
The remainder of the book offers less-known examples, such as the 
passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.  Many of the contemporary books 
about immigration and civil rights have centered on the experiences of 
Latinos and African Americans.  In contrast, what really stands out in 
Huddled Masses is its thoughtful inclusion of Asians and Asian 
Americans and its meaningful discussion of the existing tensions 
between immigration law and civil rights.  This discussion is showcased 
in Johnson’s valuable analysis of the history of exclusion and deportation 
of noncitizens under the U.S. immigration laws, which, incidentally, 
serve as the bedrock for modern immigration law.16 
II.  THE RACIAL ORIGINS OF THE PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE 
Professor Johnson correctly recalls that “[c]onsistently unwilling to 
intervene on behalf of noncitizens, the courts have emphasized the 
‘plenary power’ of Congress, based on notions of national sovereignty 
over the substantive admissions and deportation provisions of the 
immigration laws.”17 Professor of Law Gabriel Chin also shares this 
view.  Chin asserts that Congress has not hesitated to use the Supreme 
Court–recognized plenary power to discriminate against perceived 
undesirable groups, such as homosexuals, Mormons, the mentally 
retarded, Southern and Eastern Europeans, Africans, Mexicans, and 
Asians.18  Johnson explains that the plenary power doctrine has its 
origins in the foundational cases Chae Chan Ping v. United States19 (the 
Chinese Exclusion Case) and Fong Yue Ting v. United States20 (the Chinese 
Deportation Case), which together established the formal rule that 
Congress’ power over the admission of aliens to this country is absolute.  
Johnson then states that the government and the courts all explicitly 
relied on the racial characteristics of the Chinese to justify establishing 
the doctrine. 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 11. 
17 Id. at 4; see also Kevin R. Johnson, A “Hard Look” at the Executive Branch’s Asylum 
Decisions, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 279, 305 (1991). 
18 Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional 
Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1998) (citations omitted). 
19 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
20 149 U.S. 698 (1893). 
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Undoubtedly, racially and culturally, the Chinese were frequently 
compared with black Americans and white Americans—comparisons 
that stressed racial hierarchies, the perceived immorality of the Chinese, 
their supposed cultural inferiority, and their ultimate inability to 
assimilate into American society.  Johnson explains that what legal rights 
the country formally extended to blacks, it truthfully denied Chinese 
immigrants.21  For example, in an early showing of how the shared 
interests of African Americans and Asian Americans are connected, 
Justice John Marshall Harlan—often lauded for his grand 
pronouncement in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson22  that “our 
constitution is color-blind,”—noted a particular irony.23  Emphasizing 
that the “separate but equal” doctrine applied to blacks, whose 
participation in the political community was unquestionable, Harlan 
noted that Chinese immigrants are “a race so different from our own that 
we do not permit those belonging to it to become citizens of the United 
States.”24  Johnson pointed out that Justice Harlan sought the protection 
of blacks by denigrating the Chinese, leaving no doubt about his 
sympathies on the question of racial superiority.25   
Asian Americans are also referred to in Johnson’s examination of the 
U.S. immigration laws in terms of what the laws reveal about society’s 
dominant views toward the civil rights of subordinated groups in the 
United States.  Johnson discusses the wholesale prohibition of the 
immigration of Chinese working class people to this country in the late 
1800s, which, at the time, reflected the dominant white population’s 
view of Chinese Americans and the status of Chinese American civil 
rights.26  More specifically, “the era of exclusion of Chinese immigrants 
in the 1800s occurred almost simultaneously with punitive, often violent, 
action against the Chinese on the West Coast,” where anti-Chinese 
sentiment and widespread discrimination were rampant.27  Ultimately, 
                                                 
21 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 16, 19-20. 
22 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
23 Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 552, 561 (Harlan, J., dissenting); JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 20. 
25 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 20 (reviewing Justice Harlan’s opinion). 
26 Id. at 14; see also Frank H. Wu, Changing America: Three Arguments About Asian 
Americans and the Law, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 811, 816 (1996). 
27 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 14.  The number of Chinese was minuscule in the United 
States until the discovery of gold in California in 1849, and with the scarcity of laborers in 
the minefields, Chinese immigration was initially encouraged.  Henry S. Cohn & Harvey 
Gee, “No, No, No, No!”: Three Sons of Connecticut Who Opposed the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 3 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 22 (2003). 
Soon after the completion of the railroad in the 1870s, the country entered an economic 
downturn, and the Chinese became scapegoats for the nation’s economic ailments.  There 
Gee: Some Thoughts and Truths About Immigration Myths:  The "Huddled M
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
944 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
Johnson says, Congress passed the anti-Chinese exclusionary laws of the 
1800s on the heels of the abolition of slavery and the ratification of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. 
To be sure, Johnson notes that “[t]he shameful treatment of Chinese 
immigrants by federal, state, and local governments (as well as by the 
public at large) in the 1800s represents a bitter underside to U.S. 
history.”28  Johnson further explains that the categories of people that the 
nation seeks to exclude reflect society’s attitude toward both citizens and 
legal immigrants residing in the United States.  Also, the law protects 
against such discrimination toward citizen minorities, but Johnson warns 
that no such moderating influence exists to protect noncitizens.  
Johnson acknowledges that the periods and episodes of volatile 
xenophobic attacks on aliens in the United States is a cyclical matter that 
will likely continue, along with popular opinions about “foreigners.”29  
He explains that immigrant status and race are immutable 
characteristics, not fixed by biology:  “The law creates ‘aliens’ as 
outsiders who are allocated few political and legal rights.  Moreover, the 
legal construction of ‘aliens’ not only affects the general public’s view of 
noncitizens but also contributes to their harsh treatment.”30   
III. THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 AS A PURELY HUMANITARIAN MEASURE? 
Johnson theorizes about unequal treatment against foreigners, or 
those perceived to be foreigners.  Johnson contends that this notion was 
reified with the historical Chinese exclusionary laws and reincarnated in 
the anti-Asian legislation invoked against Indochinese refugees during 
the late 1970s.  With this in mind, Johnson argues that a war on 
noncitizens of color focuses on their immigration status as opposed to 
their race, and this serves to vent social frustration and hatred.  For 
example, he notes that “[m]any commentators have lauded the Refugee 
Act of 1980, which for the first time allowed noncitizens who flee 
political and related persecutions in their homelands the general right to 
                                                                                                             
was a severe economic downturn in 1873.  When the initial curiosity about the Chinaman 
began to fade, the resentment against the Chinese became more apparent.  Although the 
Chinese quickly gained a reputation for being exceedingly industrious and hardworking, 
they soon fell victim to the ill will of whites.  Chinese were seen as taking away the jobs of 
native workers. 
Id. at 24-25. 
28 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 17. 
29 Id. at 6. 
30 Id. 
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apply for asylum in the United States.”31  However, Johnson points out 
that “Congress’s passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 counted among its 
more humanitarian purposes the hope of reducing the number of 
refugees admitted from Vietnam.”32   
The Refugee Act has been overlooked by mainstream scholars, who 
seem more interested in citing to the Act only for its perfunctory 
purpose:  to function as a historical background for analyses of more 
recent immigration legislation.  Many immigration scholars have lauded 
the Act as a great accomplishment in immigration law.  For instance, 
immigration scholars Deborah Anker and Michael Posner, in an article 
outlining the legislative history of the Refugee Act, argue that the Act 
reflects the evolution of a consensus for a humanitarian 
nondiscriminatory policy, and that the Act created mechanisms to 
resolve the continual friction between the Executive Branch and 
Congress over the control and standards for refugee admissions.33  They 
conclude by stating:  “We believe that the Refugee Act provides a sound 
and practical legislative base from which a successful refugee policy can 
be developed.  Accordingly, we do not recommend nor do we believe 
that it would be wise to modify the Refugee Act as enacted in 1980.”34  
Remarkably, restrictionists have also misunderstood the Act and refugee 
policy.  For example, in his published anti-immigrant polemic, The 
Unmaking of Americans:  How Multiculturalism Has Undermined America’s 
Assimilation Ethic, John Miller, a political reporter for the National 
Review and former vice-president of the Center for Equal Opportunity, 
renews the issue of national identity.  Miller states that due to the 
increased immigration of people who do not want to be Americans, the 
United States is losing its national purpose.35  Miller professes that 
“[r]efugee policy is driven almost entirely by humanitarian concerns and 
the refugees themselves have not always had much time for their 
departure” from their native countries.36  
These sentiments have since become the standard and generally 
accepted view of the Refugee Act of 1980.  But was it really meant to 
serve a humanitarian end in granting asylum to refugees, or was it 
                                                 
31 Id. at 26. 
32 Id. at 39; see also Johnson, supra note 18, at 354. 
33 See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History 
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9 (1981). 
34 Id. at 12. 
35 JOHN J. MILLER, THE UNMAKING OF AMERICANS: HOW MULTICULTURALISM HAS 
UNDERMINED AMERICA’S ASSIMILATION ETHIC 104 (1998). 
36 Id. at 16. 
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passed to limit the number of Indochinese refugees arriving in the 
United States?  A closer reading of the legislative history of the Refugee 
Act reveals some support for the popular perception that Congress 
implemented the Act to move the United States into accord with the 
obligation imposed under international refugee law.  Hence, it can be 
argued that the Refugee Act, for the first time, provided noncitizens 
fleeing political and related persecution in their homelands a general 
right to apply for asylum in the United States.37  Nevertheless, the more 
probable conclusion is that the passage of the Act was designed to 
exclude the admission of refugees from Southeast Asia. 
Johnson asserts that “the Act was motivated in part by a desire to 
limit U.S. acceptance of Vietnamese refugees, of whom the President had 
allowed liberal admissions after the 1975 fall of Saigon.”38  Surprisingly, 
this view is also shared by the Federation for American Immigration 
Reform, a well-known conservative immigration restrictionist group. 
Congress enacted the 1980 refugee legislation partly in response to 
its increasing frustration with the difficulty of dealing with the ongoing 
large-scale Indochinese refugee flow under the existing ad hoc refugee 
admission and resettlement mechanisms.  By the end of the 1970s, 
Congress reached the consensus that a more coherent and equitable 
approach to refugee admission and resettlement was needed.  As a 
result, the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted.39 
In the hope of preventing future mass migrations, the Refugee Act 
established numerical limitations and generally restricted the power of 
the President with respect to refugee admission.  Interestingly, legal 
challenges have been brought against the Act.  Johnson remarks that 
“[y]ears after Congress passed the law, Vietnamese citizens brought suit 
against the U.S. government, charging discrimination based on 
nationality in the processing of visa applications.”40  He contends:  “The 
                                                 
37 Id.; see also Bill Ong Hing, No Place for Angels: In Reaction to Kevin Johnson, 2000 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 559, 594-96 (2000); David D. Jividen, Comment, Rediscovering the Burden of Proof for 
Asylum and the Withholding of Deportation, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 954 (1986). 
38 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 26. 
39 Id.; see also Federation for American Immigration Reform, U.S. Immigration History, 
available at http:www.fairus.org/Research/Research.cfm?ID=1820&c=2 (last visited Feb. 25, 
2005). 
40 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 26.  Vietnamese refugees have brought some challenges 
against the Refugee Act on the basis that it discriminates based on national origin.  See, e.g., 
Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Consular 
Affairs, 74 F.3d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Fang-Sui Yau v. Gustafson, 623 F. Supp. 1515 (C.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
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Vietnam War also reveals a relationship between Asian subordination 
and improvements for African Americans.  As the civil rights movement 
of the 1960s gained rights for African Americans, the escalation of the 
war in Vietnam increased racism toward the Vietnamese people, which 
lingers to this day.”41  Here, many legal scholars may be disappointed 
that Johnson did not expand his narrative of the issues much more.  Had 
he done so, his thesis would have been noticeably strengthened.   
To this day, the Refugee Act of 1980 is still widely misunderstood.  
Most academic commentators have focused on the fact that special 
humanitarian restrictions on Vietnamese immigration undermined the 
avowed foreign policy purposes of the Refugee Act.  Others suggest that 
reference to the Vietnam War in and of itself is insufficient to explain the 
structure of the law.  The reality, however, is that the Refugee Act 
provided strict controls on the admission of Vietnamese.  The fact that 
the Act was passed to terminate the continual ad hoc admissions of 
Indochinese refugees underlies the rhetoric of those who regard the Act 
as a great law passed in the spirit of humanitarianism and those who 
view its implementation as largely preventing the practice of political 
favoritism allowed by pre-1980 refugee laws.  The legislative history 
demonstrates that the Act was neither entirely humanitarian nor 
egalitarian.  Indeed, Congress passed it even though the Act would 
create a comprehensive ceiling on the number of Indochinese refugees 
permitted to enter the United States. 
Without doubt, there was an unpredictable flow of refugees after the 
end of the Vietnam War.  The United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam 
left the region in a state of social chaos.  The large Southeast Asian 
immigration following the Vietnam War could not have been 
anticipated.  Before 1975, Vietnamese immigration was small.  Between 
1966 and 1975, 20,038 Vietnamese arrived in the United States.42  When 
U.S. military troops evacuated Vietnam after the fall of Saigon in 1975, 
the number of Vietnamese Americans was negligible, but the collapse of 
the South Vietnamese government in April of 1975 caused a mass exodus 
from Vietnam.  All in all, from 1975 through 1979, at least ten separate 
paroles, each limited in duration and number and overwhelmed by the 
following crisis, were used to admit over three hundred thousand 
Indochinese refugees.43  
                                                 
41 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 22. 
42 Id. at 34. 
43 Id. at 23. 
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A review of the legislative record illustrates congressional awareness 
of the Vietnamese refugee crisis.  As the world’s attention was placed on 
the plight of the boat people, the upsurge in Asian entrants that started 
in the mid-1970s caused policymakers to have dissatisfaction and serious 
concern.44  In fact, the continual admission of refugees from Vietnam 
resulted in a negative reaction to Southeast Asians.45  After 1975, 
policymakers became less patient as Asians began entering the United 
States in increasing numbers under existing guidelines.46  
The Indochinese refugees became the topic of public debate.  An 
overwhelming majority of Americans disfavored any further assistance 
in evacuating the Vietnamese.  This great anti-Vietnamese sentiment 
amongst the general public was mirrored in the generally restrictionist 
attitudes of interested congressional committees.47  The traditional 
restrictionist attitude was prevalent among some members of Congress 
and mainstream American society.   
The resettlement assistance for refugees increased when the Refugee 
Act was adopted in 1980.48  The Act authorized a resettlement assistance 
program to last for three years.  During that period, the agencies that 
managed the reception and settlement of new refugees were allocated 
funds for the necessities of the incoming refugees in the form of clothing, 
housing, food, English language instruction, and job training.49  Almost 
immediately, there was a negative reaction to Vietnamese refugees.50  
Although foreign policy was a major motivation for the change in 
immigration policy, it was not the sole motivation.  The salience of race 
and xenophobia was very apparent during the refugee crisis.51  In the 
                                                 
44 Anker & Posner, supra note 33, at 3. 
45 See Bill Ong Hing, TO BE AN AMERICAN: CULTURAL PLURALISM AND THE RHETORIC OF 
ASSIMILATION 27 (1997). 
46 Id. 
47 See Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law and Policy Scholarship, Law in the 
Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 551 (2000). 
48 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 2. 
49 GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLAN, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES AND AMERICA’S 
HALF-OPEN DOOR, 1945 TO THE PRESENT 115-17 (1986). 
50 Id.  The tensions between native-born Americans and Vietnamese immigrants and 
refugees still exist today, as evidenced in the racial dimensions of the recent deer hunting 
accident, which involved a Hmong suspected of killing six white hunters.  See, e.g., Hunting 
Tradition Strong Among Hmong in State, CAPITAL TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at 3A; Vikki Ortiz, 
Cultural Gap Puts Wedge Between Hunters; Hmong Leaders, DNR See Room for Greater 
Outreach, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 28, 2004, at 6. 
51 See Kevin R. Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something New, Something 
Borrowed, Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-
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late 1970s, politicians in Congress seized upon the refugee crisis and the 
feelings that it aroused, and magnified an already acute apprehension—
if not fear—of the seemingly endless flow of Asians into the country. The 
crisis was defined in ways that invited readily ascertainable policy 
solutions to create political opportunities. 
Because of modern sensibilities about race in the United States, it is 
not surprising that the race of immigrants tends to be suppressed as an 
outwardly-expressed reason for restricting immigration.52  Legislative 
history shows that Congress desired to change the term to be applied in 
determining the allocation of refugee admissions from “special concern” 
to “special humanitarian concern.”53  The intent of congressional 
committees was to emphasize the plight of the refugees themselves 
rather than their national origins or political affiliations.  More likely, 
however, the committees intended to limit the total number of 
Indochinese refugees, instead of any genuine humanitarian concerns. 
Many times, House Reports and House Committee statements stressed 
human rights concerns on the Judiciary.  These statements emphasized 
humanitarian considerations, placing the plight of the refugees and the 
pattern of human rights violations in the country of origin as the first 
factors the courts should weigh.  Interestingly, in the final conference 
report, all use of the term “special concern” was replaced with “special 
humanitarian concern.”54  In this subtle way, the public’s negative 
opinion of Vietnamese refugees was reflected and echoed in the opinions 
held by many members of Congress.55  
Despite the view by some that the Refugee Act is an instrument for 
humanitarian ends, the Act’s actual administration has not prevented 
egregious abuse by the Executive Branch as expected.  In practice, the 
Refugee Act of 1980 has been administered in a manner that is 
reminiscent of the arbitrary use of the seventh preference and parole 
provisions.  The 1980 Refugee Act, which established new controls on 
refugee admissions, actually caused the decline—if not permanent 
stoppage—of the flow of refugees entering the United States, despite 
                                                                                                             
IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 174 (Juan F. Perea, ed. 1997); see also Anker & 
Posner, supra note 33, at 31. 
52 See Johnson, supra note 51, at 174. 
53 H.R. 2816, 96th Cong., (1st Sess. 1979); 125 CONG. REC. 12367 (1979). 
54 Refugee Act of 1970: Hearing on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, 
and Int’l Law of the House of Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. 44 (197) (testimony of 
Whitney Ellsworth and Hurst Hannum, Amnesty International U.S.A.); 8 U.S.C. §§ 13-14 
(1980). 
55 LOESCHER & SCANLAN, supra note 49, at 102-69. 
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persistent humanitarian pressure on the United States.  Needless to say, 
as a result of the Refugee Act of 1980 and the adoption of subsequent 
recommendations made by the Selection Commission, the admission of 
Vietnamese refugees has experienced a gradual downward trend.56 
Interestingly, in the decades after the passage of the Refugee Act of 
1980, the allegations of discrimination against Vietnamese immigrants 
were made in other areas of immigration and refugee law.  In one case, 
the Plaintiff successfully challenged the State Department policy 
requiring his wife’s return to Vietnam for resettlement through 
Vietnam’s Orderly Departure policy on the basis that it discriminated 
against visa applicants based on their nationality.57  As Johnson points 
out in Huddled Masses, there were also actions brought challenging the 
State Department’s consular venue policy with regard to Vietnamese and 
Laotian migrants seeking immigrant visas.  In Legal Assistance for 
Vietnamese Asylum Seekers v. Department of State, Bureau of Consular 
Affairs58 two Vietnamese migrants, the migrants’ U.S. sponsors, and a 
nonprofit legal rights organization challenged the State Department 
policy that prohibited U.S. consular officials from discriminating on the 
basis of nationality in the issuance of immigrant visas.59  The Appellants 
argued that the State Department’s refusal to process the immigrant visa 
applications of Vietnamese nationals on the same basis that it processes 
the applications of aliens of other nationalities violated the constitutional 
rights of Vietnamese applicants.60  According to the appellant’s brief, the 
Executive Branch sought to justify its discriminatory conduct in this case 
on what it characterized as foreign policy concerns:  
[T]his nationality-based classification . . . denies Resident 
Plaintiffs their right to equal projection of the law under 
the U.S. Constitution . . . . The Department’s April 1993 
policy discriminates against Resident Plaintiffs by 
denying their family members the right to have their IV 
applications processed because of their Vietnamese 
nationality . . . . While the courts have generally 
acknowledged the plenary authority of Congress to 
make classifications in the area of immigration, 
Congress has not made a classification in this case—only 
the Department has.  To the contrary, Congress has 
                                                 
56 Id. at 107-08. 
57 Chau v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 891 F. Supp. 650 (D. D.C.  1995). 
58 104 F.3d 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
59 Id. at 1350-51. 
60 Id. at 1351. 
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expressly prohibited discrimination on the basis of 
nationality in the visa issuance process.  Accordingly, 
the Department may not invoke the mantle of plenary 
power over the admission of aliens as a means of 
shielding its discriminatory conduct form strict judicial 
scrutiny . . . .  
The fact that in formulating its April 1993 policy the Department 
may have been motivated by administrative or even foreign policy 
concerns—rather than any type of racial or ethnic animus toward 
persons of Vietnamese origin—does not alter the inherently 
discriminatory nature of the Department’s conduct.61 
However, the substance of the equal protection claim was never 
reached by the court because the court determined that Appellants 
lacked standing to bring it.62  But even if the court had fully analyzed the 
constitutional claim, it would have been unlikely that the court would 
have been able to detect any racial or foreign policy bias in the Executive 
Branch’s asylum determinations.  In a law review article written by 
Johnson over a decade ago, he asserts as much:  “The Executive Branch 
rarely admits that foreign policy influences an asylum 
decision . . . . Unfortunately, a decade of experience with the Refugee Act 
has made clear that the foreign policy influence on the Executive’s 
asylum decisions will not be eliminated absent some sort of 
intervention.”63 
IV.  BLACK AND YELLOW:  AFRICAN AMERICANS AND ASIAN AMERICANS IN 
THEIR HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS 
It bears repeating that Johnson’s book is a major contribution to the 
immigration literature due to its inclusion of Asian Americans and its 
accompanying insights.  A particular strength of Huddled Masses lies in 
Johnson’s comparison of the experiences between Asians and African 
Americans.  As Johnson recalls throughout the book, the relationship 
between the treatment of African Americans and other racial minorities, 
including Asians, can be traced back to nineteenth century constitutional 
jurisprudence, and well into the future in the affirmative action forum.  
As a historical matter, Gabriel Chin notes:  
                                                 
61 Br. for Appellants, Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, 104 F.3d 1349 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997), available at 1994 WL 16182778. 
62 Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, 104 F. 3d at 1353-54. 
63 Johnson, supra note 17, at 283-84. 
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The parallels between the African-American and Asian-American 
legal experience in America are not coincidental.  Rather, the similarity 
exists because the presence of Asians, like African-Americans, threatened 
white supremacy.  Consequently, the Asian threat, like the African-
American threat, was eliminated by laws that were in turn blessed by the 
Supreme Court.64 
However, Chin says that modernly, “[s]ome commentators seem to 
believe that Asian Americans and African Americans occupy the 
opposite ends of a certain spectrum; Asian Americans are called the 
‘model minority’ in pointed contrast to African Americans, while African 
Americans are regarded as the paradigmatic case of a racially subjugated 
group.”65 
Johnson’s assertion that historical events demonstrate how particular 
ethnic and racial groups have been pitted against one another is a 
recurring theme.  For instance, he notes that “the historical context of the 
infamous decision to intern Japanese Americans and Japanese 
immigrants during World War II sheds light on the interrelationship 
between society’s treatment of different minority groups.”66  The 
Supreme Court ruling in Korematsu v. United States67 allowed U.S. citizens 
of Japanese ancestry, including many born in this country, to be detained 
in internment camps.  The Korematsu decision “reveals the difficulties 
inherent in drawing fine legal distinctions between noncitizens and 
citizens who share a common ancestry.”68  A long-time civil rights 
attorney, Dale Minami writes: 
In the original 1944 Korematsu decision, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld the mass incarceration of 120,000 Americans of Japanese 
ancestry during World War II without charges, notice, trial or due 
process, and without any evidence of espionage and sabotage by persons 
of Japanese ancestry.  Despite the Court’s lofty pronouncements that it 
would subject the government’s discriminatory action to the highest 
level of scrutiny, it nevertheless took judicial notice of innocent facts, 
half-truths, and stereotypes of Japanese Americans.69  
                                                 
64 Chin, supra note 18, at 28. 
65 Id. at 23. 
66 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 20-21. 
67 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
68 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 21. 
69 Susan Kiyomi Serrano & Dale Minami, Korematsu v. United States: “A Constant 
Caution” in a Time of Crisis, 10 ASIAN L.J. 37, 37-38 (2003); see also DAVID COLE, ENEMY 
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At the same time, Johnson reveals that World War II labor demands 
offered African Americans unprecedented access to employment.70  Had 
Johnson focused on Asians here and analyzed Asian American 
jurisprudence, he could have discussed that there has always been a 
racialized identification of Asian Americans as foreign and “un-
American” that emerged through a process involving the social 
construction of an Asian “race.”  The Court’s treatment of the Chinese as 
foreign reverberated the controversy over the racial positioning of 
Asians at the time.  Academic Lisa Lowe explains that “oriental 
racializations” portrayed Asians as physically and intellectually different 
from whites, especially during periods of economic downturn.  When 
coupled with nativist anti-Asian backlash, these perceptions promoted 
the immigration exclusion acts.  Similarly, Chin argues that the “Asian 
Exclusion Laws enshrined the idea that Asians were ineradicably foreign 
and un-American, that they were dangerous and inferior.”71  
Nevertheless, Johnson draws his attention to a better known and more 
infamous event in American history. 
Undoubtedly, the internment of Japanese Americans during World 
War II was one of most egregious examples of the social construction of 
Japanese and Japanese Americans as all foreigners, without any 
distinction whatsoever.  Even before Pearl Harbor, Japanese immigrants 
and their American-born children endured great hardship in this 
country because they were perceived as economic threats.  As such, 
Japanese immigrants were subjected to official discrimination and 
political protest.  Fueled by fear and hostility, the Japanese faced 
exclusion through legislation, boycotts, school segregation, and 
propaganda.  The flames of anti-Japanese animus were further fueled by 
the bombing of Pearl Harbor.  The bombing allowed for the creation and 
maintenance of concentration camps for all individuals of Japanese 
descent, including American citizens who did not identify with Japan or 
the Japanese culture, but rather fully assimilated into the mainstream 
American culture.  Other than his or her skin color, each internee was 
                                                                                                             
ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 97 
(2003).  David Cole comments: 
The role that racial stereotypes played in the transition is underscored 
by the fact that there was never any evidence to support the concern 
that all Japanese living among us posed a threat.  None of the interned 
Japanese was ever charged with, much less convicted of, espionage, 
sabotage, or treason.  But the absence of evidence did not stop the 
demands for internment. 
Id. 
70 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 21. 
71 Chin, supra note 18, at 47. 
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just like any other American.  Such queries and astute observations lead 
up to Johnson’s section on alienage rights in the United States. 
Noticeably, affirmative action is only mentioned once or twice in 
Huddled Masses.  While Johnson may be excused on the basis that 
affirmative action is beyond the scope of his volume, I suggest it 
warrants some attention in the discussion of immigration and civil 
rights.  Until fairly recently, the affirmative action debate was largely 
framed in a black and white binary.  Occasionally, minimal attention is 
given to Latino concerns, but the identity of Latinos tends to be 
subsumed by the African American experience.  Discussions about 
affirmative action rarely include Asian Americans.72  
All too often, mainstream America does not think of Asian 
Americans as being beneficiaries of affirmative action because of the 
“model minority myth,” which perpetuates the fiction that somehow 
Asian Americans are shielded from racial prejudice.73  The “model 
minority myth” describes the racial experience of Asian Americans.  The 
name gives note to how Asian Americans are portrayed as a model of 
success, a characteristic which has lent itself to the creation of “the model 
minority myth.”74  This myth depicts Asian Americans as one monolithic 
ethnic group that achieves economic success and social acceptance 
through education and hard work without governmental assistance or 
racial preferences.75  The problem with the myth image is two-fold:  It 
obfuscates the fact that many Asian Americans are still in need of 
affirmative action, and it is often used by opponents of affirmative action 
to show that affirmative action is not needed to help minorities.76  The 
                                                 
72 See Frank H. Wu, The Arrival of Asian Americans: An Agenda for Legal Scholarship, 10 
ASIAN L.J. 1, 5 (2003) (“[The black/white paradigm] is assumed to be factually correct 
without substantial analysis.  Such an approach leads to the exclusion of Asian Americans, 
Latinos, and other non-African American minority groups, or implicitly deems them to be 
the equivalent of blacks or whites.”); Deanna K. Chuang, Power, Merit, and the Limitations of 
the Black and White Binary in the Affirmative Action Debate: The Case of Asian Americans at 
Whitney High School, 8 ASIAN L.J. 31, 38 (2001). 
73 See William C. Kidder, Situating Asian Pacific Americans in the Law School Affirmative 
Action Debate: Empirical Facts About Thernstrom’s Rhetorical Acts, 7 ASIAN L.J. 29, 60-61 
(2000). 
74 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 40; see also Rhoda J. Yen, Racial Stereotyping of Asians and 
Asian Americans and Its Effect on Criminal Justice: A Reflection on the Wayne Lo Case, 7 ASIAN L. 
J. 1, 2 (2000) (“Asian Americans have received applause for their academic achievements, 
high family incomes, industriousness, low levels of criminal behavior, and stable family 
structures.  Asian Americans may be perceived as blending neatly into corporate and 
community structures because of their cultural values of non-aggression and preservation 
of the status quo.”). 
75 See FRANK. H. WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BLACK AND WHITE 40 (2002). 
76 Id. 
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model minority stereotype is often used to place Asian Americans in a 
falsely elevated position relative to African Americans and Latinos.77  
What is lost with these controversies is the fact that while Asian 
Americans have experienced prejudice in the past, and still continue to 
endure societal discrimination—however subtle it may or may not be—
the African American experience is much worse.   
Christopher Edley Jr., a former professor at Harvard Law School and 
current dean at UC Berkeley School of Law, claims that affirmative 
action is still necessary, providing evidence of continuing discrimination 
in our society.78  Edley points out that the economic disparity between 
blacks and whites in America is daunting considering that, while fewer 
than three percent of all college graduates are unemployed, whites are 
nearly twice as likely as blacks to have college degrees.  Using raw data 
to show racial inequality, Edley places the burden of persuasion to end 
affirmative action on its opponents.79  He believes that because of the 
absence of clear and compelling empirical data showing that the costs of 
affirmative action outweigh its benefits, its use should be continued.  
Edley argues that most employment decisions and application selections 
are not made strictly on the basis of merit, but rather, these decisions 
incorporate some form of generally accepted bias or preferential 
treatment based on nepotism or cronyism.80  These choices are often 
based on “personal preferences having everything to do with taste, 
comfort, and convenience and nothing to do with efficiency in 
maximizing profits or with conventional excellence.”81 
The U.S. government’s treatment of citizens differs from its 
treatment of “aliens”—those who are not U.S. citizens.  Johnson asserts 
that even though the United States claims to exercise inherent rights as a 
sovereign nation, it has often, both historically and modernly, refused to 
welcome people of color, political dissidents, the poor, criminals, 
women, and lesbians and gay men who sought to immigrate.  Unlike the 
courts’ participation in the struggle for citizens’ rights, Johnson argues 
that “judicial review of the constitutionality of laws that provide for the 
exclusion and deportation of immigrants has been negligible.”82  He 
                                                 
77 See ANGELO ANCHETA, RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 158 
(1998). 
78 CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, 
AND AMERICAN VALUES 42-45 (1996). 
79 Id. at 42. 
80 Id. at 120. 
81 Id. 
82 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 3, 175. 
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observes that as long as noncitizens are afforded minimal procedural 
safeguards, the courts have afforded Congress free reign with respect to 
exclusion and deportation of noncitizens.  Johnson laments:  
Because of the unpopularity of—even hatred toward—foreigners 
among the general population in times of crisis and social unrest, a 
meaningful political check on the unfair treatment of immigrants does 
not exist.  As a result, both Congress and the president have the ability to 
direct the most extreme action toward noncitizens with  little fear of 
provoking a judicial response.83 
Against this backdrop, Johnson asserts that the timing of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Korematsu, one of the most well-known 
equal protection cases of the twentieth century, should not be ignored.  
He explains that the infamous Korematsu decision came less than a 
decade before the much-revered decision in Brown v. Board of Education,84 
which vindicates the rights of African Americans.85  Brown, which 
rejected the “separate but equal” doctrine, was a landmark achievement 
for African Americans.86  Accordingly, Johnson explains: 
Despite the brief time span, these cases represent the very best and 
worst of U.S. constitutional law.  While persons of Japanese ancestry 
were rebuilding the remnants of their lives after the turmoil of legally 
                                                 
83 Id. at 3. 
84 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
85 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 3, 175; see also Neil Gotanda, Book Review, “Other Non-
Whites” in American Legal History: A Review of Justice at War, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1186, 1191 
(1985).  Gotanda states: 
[W]hen the Supreme Court addressed Black and White race relations 
in Brown v. Board of Education . . . the Court drew upon dicta in [the 
internment cases] to argue that racial classifications were inherently 
suspect and required careful judicial scrutiny.  In so doing, the Court 
brought Japanese-Americans and Other non-Whites into the emerging 
mainstream of racial jurisprudence and minimized the constitutional 
distance between them and Blacks. 
Id. at 1191; cf. Frank H. Wu, Beyond Black, White and Brown, THE NATION, Apr. 15, 2004, 
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040503&c=4&s=forum (“Even at 
the level of technical doctrine, it is not clear what Brown means—if it means anything 
substantive at all.  The controlling precedent for the interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection has become, instead of Brown, the cases 
allowing the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II.”). 
86 Chin, supra note 18, at 3 (“Brown led the Supreme Court to invalidate racial 
discrimination in employment, public benefits, voting, jury selection, criminal justice, 
marriage and the family—that is, in virtually every area of American law and life.”). 
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sanctioned internment, African Americans were seeing hope in the 
demise of “separate but equal” as the law of the land.87 
In Brown, the Supreme Court held that segregation in the public 
schools fails to constitute equal protection of the laws.  Brown became a 
monumental decision, in that the Court formally vindicated a major 
change in the U.S. civil rights landscape.88  Johnson continues onward to 
discuss how the Brown decision, together with the actions of Martin 
Luther King Jr. and other participants in the civil rights movement, 
helped dismantle the state-referred segregation of public facilities 
throughout the South.89  However, Johnson asserts that Brown left 
unresolved important questions about what constituted racial 
discrimination.  Here though, Johnson is not as clear as he could be.  I 
would interpret Johnson’s remarks as referring to the weakening over 
time of affirmative action. 
The differences in opinion about affirmative action began as soon as 
the programs were implemented.  During the sixties, affirmative action 
combined the past discrimination and diversity rationales to command 
broad support for the limited principle that white male institutions 
should be dismantled to insure inclusion of women and previously 
excluded minorities.90  Both race and sex created “caste” systems in 
which women, African Americans, and in various times and places, 
Asian Americans, Latinos, and other groups were excluded on a 
wholesale basis.91  The civil rights movement won broad support for the 
principle that this exclusion was wrong and that its remedy required 
“affirmative action”—at least until individuals could receive 
consideration on their merits.92  However, by the 1990s, opponents of 
                                                 
87 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 21. 
88 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 3. 
89 Id. at 21-22. 
90 See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 28 
(1996) (acknowledging that even though affirmative action was initially justified as 
compensation for past discrimination, it was expanded for the new justification of 
diversity); NICOLAUS MILLS, TO LOOK LIKE AMERICA, INTRODUCTION TO DEBATING 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACE, GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION 10-14 
(Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) (outlining the history of affirmative action and noting the shift 
from the past compensation rationale to the goal of diversity). 
91 See Jean Carey Bond, Affirmative Action at the Crossroads: An Essay, 53 GUILD PRAC. 4, 
6-8 (1996) (summarizing the history of social and racial discrimination against women and 
racial minorities, and explaining the origins of affirmative action). 
92 See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 9-10 (1996) 
(explaining the three original motives for affirmative action: to fight discrimination, to be 
used as a tool for integration, and to reduce the poverty of women and certain racial 
groups); see also Corinne E. Anderson, A Current Perspective: The Erosion of Affirmative Action 
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affirmative action argued that affirmative action had succeeded and was 
no longer necessary.  These opponents contend that most institutions 
include women and minorities and will continue to do so.  Hence, to the 
extent remaining institutions discriminate in ways reminiscent of the 
caste system of old, discrimination law is the answer, not affirmative 
action.  Furthermore, opponents allege that the continuation of 
affirmative action creates a racial “spoils” system.93  Nevertheless, 
supporters of affirmative action argue that even if the caste system has 
been dismantled, the benefited groups are a long way from equality.94  
As such, the penultimate question of what it means to be an American 
citizen, and the privileges to which one is entitled as a member of the 
citizenry, remains unclear.  
John Denvir, a professor of law at the University of San Francisco 
and author of Democracy’s Constitution:  Claiming the Privileges of American 
Citizenship,95 makes a genuine effort to answer some of these questions.  
Denvir points out what he thinks are certain very specific privileges that 
citizens should enjoy in the United States.  According to Denvir, the 
Supreme Court has taken an ever-narrowing approach to the Fourteenth 
Amendment Clause.  In particular, Denvir says that the Court has 
generally failed to address exactly what the clause means.  Denvir 
believes that access to education, an opportunity to earn a living, and 
financial security are necessary to be a productive citizen in this 
country.96  As such, Denvir insists that an interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that is faithful to its authors’ vision would yield 
a series of privileges of American citizenship, including “certain social 
                                                                                                             
in University Admissions, 32 AKRON L. REV. 181, 190-92 (1999) (describing the origins and 
original design of affirmative action). Initially, affirmative action was directed primarily at 
employment, but it was later expanded to other areas, including admissions programs in 
higher education.  Id. 
93 See Charles Murray, Affirmative Racism, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACE, 
GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND POLITICS OF INCLUSION 204-08 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994) (asserting 
that racial preferences, instead of providing equal opportunities in education and 
employment, will actually perpetuate racism and discrimination). 
94 See Erin Anadkat, Affirmative Action Hailed and Attacked by Student Speakers, THE DAILY 
ILLINI, Mar. 10, 1999, available at http://www.illinimedia.com/di/mar_99/mar10/news05. 
html (reporting on Frank Wu’s argument that affirmative action is still necessary to 
alleviate the past discrimination that created grave inequalities amongst racial minorities 
and whites). 
95 JOHN DENVIR, DEMOCRACY’S CONSTITUTION:  CLAIMING THE PRIVILEGES OF AMERICAN 
CITIZENSHIP (2001). 
96 Id. at 9. 
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rights such as the opportunity to earn a living and the right to a first-rate 
education.”97   
Johnson seems to implicitly echo Denvir’s sentiments.  The thrust of 
the second half of the Huddled Masses is its discussion of alienage 
discrimination, where Johnson suggests that law and judicial review 
could moderate the existing aggression toward noncitizens.98  Johnson 
ends his book with his call again for expansion of legal protections for 
immigrants.99  But he concedes that it is no substitute for the vigilance 
needed to protect immigrants’ rights.  Johnson wants this country to 
“strive to replace harsh, punitive, and invidiously discriminatory 
policies with policies that foster fairer treatment of noncitizens.”100  In his 
view, this change would be consistent with an immigration history 
reflective of egalitarian principles on which this great nation is based.101  
Johnson believes that an initial step to guaranteeing equal rights for all is 
reexamining the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Here, Johnson—to his credit—engages in an examination of 
traditional equal protection and points out the importance of the critical 
differences between traditional immigration law and ordinary public 
law.102  Johnson states:  “Although the Equal Protection Clause generally 
requires ‘strict scrutiny’ of racial classifications in the law and has 
frequently invalidated them, long ago, the U.S. Supreme Court . . . 
upheld discrimination on the basis of race and national origin with 
respect to the admission of noncitizens into the country.”103  Johnson 
acknowledges that in modern times “discrimination on the basis of 
immigration status may mask an intent to discriminate against racial 
minorities, the Court ordinarily defers to ‘alienage’ classifications made 
by Congress.”104  Along these same lines, Chin, after reexamining the 
plenary power doctrine, welcomes the abolishment, or at least 
modification of, the current standard of judicial review, which is extreme 
deference to Congress.  Chin also advocates a move toward having the 
Court make reasonable distinctions between aliens and citizens, and to 
apply to them the same constitutional standards it applies in every other 
                                                 
97 Id. at 72. 
98 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 175. 
99 Id. at 174-75. 
100 Id. at 176. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at. 17. 
103 Id. (citations omitted). 
104 Id. (citations omitted). 
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area of law.105  Johnson is seemingly sympathetic to theories similar to 
those proffered by Chin, and he suggests that “because the substantive 
provisions of the immigration laws have historically been immune from 
legal constraint, the political process allows the majority to have its way 
with noncitizens.”106   
Actually, Johnson sides with other commentators advocating for the 
expansion of legal protection for immigrants, suggesting that “one 
limited possible legal solution is to make the law [extend protections] to 
noncitizens and immigrants by subjecting both immigration law and the 
conduct of the U.S. government to constitutional scrutiny.”107  This 
solution would expand the dialogue towards affording equal treatment 
to noncitizens: 
This would require that the U.S. government keep is conduct 
consistent with the Constitution and, concomitantly, recognize legal 
rights for noncitizens.  Current moves toward greater respect for the 
rights of noncitizens must be expanded to include recognition of full 
legal rights for noncitizens and a full review of the immigration laws for 
substantive fairness and equality.108 
Like Johnson, Denvir also proposes a change to the current equal 
protection analysis so that courts no longer limit the intent requirement 
to situations in which they have proof that the action was purposeful in 
the sense of hurting minorities.109  Denvir states that the current equal 
protection analysis utilized by the courts in their search for an evil 
purpose is misguided because the analysis gives an unnecessarily 
narrow definition to the term “intention,” and this “search for bad 
motivation is always costly and usually futile.”110  As an alternative, 
Denvir favors determinism testing that balances the need for efficient 
government with society’s duty to be fair to minorities, suggesting that 
this type of balancing is central to the mission of interpreting the 
Constitution.111  Denvir says that “[t]his relatively small doctrinal 
change—focusing on effects, not purpose—would have as enormous 
                                                 
105 See Chin, supra note 18, at 73. 
106 JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 17, 175. 
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effect on how courts consider government action that harms racial 
minorities.”112 
V.  CRITICAL RACE THEORY, OYAMA, AND SHELLEY:  WHAT’S RACE AND 
ALIENAGE GOT TO DO WITH IT? 
If nothing else, Huddled Masses provides the necessary groundwork 
for future Critical Race Theory work, as it reexamines pivotal legal cases 
within their proper socio-historical contexts with fresh eyes in an effort 
to present new interpretations.  In the next few passages, I provide some 
tentative thoughts relating to some of the themes offered in Huddled 
Masses.  With this in mind, I suggest that the analysis offered by Huddled 
Masses may be extended to the area of land and property rights by 
comparing two important cases, Oyama v. State of California113 and Shelley 
v. Kraemer,114 in an effort to supplement Johnson’s arguments.  Johnson 
briefly remarks in his book that after World War II ended, Japanese 
Americans experienced measured difficulties reintegrating into the 
mainstream.  One particular area was the right of Japanese Americans to 
own property, including defending their property rights against land 
seizure proceedings.  Though the California Supreme Court previously 
upheld alien land laws as constitutional, these same laws were later 
struck down by the Court in Oyama.  When compared against one 
another, Shelley and Oyama offer acutely illuminating legal points.   
In an opinion by Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, the Supreme Court in 
Oyama invalidated an alien land statute as applied, ruling that its 
implementation violated the constitutional right of Fred Oyama, a 
Japanese American, to the equal protection of the laws.  Alternatively, in 
Shelley, the Supreme Court struck down a covenant that restricted 
property ownership on the basis of race, including “Mongolians” and 
“Negroes.”  The Court concluded that enforcing the restrictive covenant 
through the courts against the African American petitioners constituted 
“state action,” and therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause.  
Demonstrating a form of synergy, Shelley is cited extensively 
throughout the Oyama opinion, and vice versa.  The interconnected 
dynamics between Oyama and Shelley illustrate how what happens to 
Asian Americans influences and affects African Americans, and vice 
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versa.  However, in the end, there are more questions raised than 
answered.  First of all, Oyama involved an application of the California 
Alien Land Law in the mid-1940s, which prohibited aliens ineligible for 
American citizenship from acquiring, owning, occupying, leasing, or 
transferring agricultural land.115  Under the law, any property acquired 
in violation of the statute would escheat as of the date of acquisition.  
The same result followed any transfer made with an intent to evade or 
avoid escheat.116  Chief Justice Vinson, in the majority opinion, declared 
that “[t]he cumulative effect [of the Act], we believe, was clearly to 
discriminate against Fred Oyama solely . . . [ on the] basis . . . that his 
father was Japanese and not American, Russian, Chinese, or English.”117  
The Court was not persuaded by the state’s argument that it was not 
race-based law but rather was a race-neutral law in both substance and 
application. 
In sharp contrast to the majority opinion, Justices Murphy and 
Rutledge in their concurrences examined the legislative history of the 
passage of the Alien Land Law, revealing the anti-Japanese animus that 
motivated its passage and also providing a summary of the history of 
anti-Japanese sentiment in this country.  Justice Murphy, in powerful 
dicta, discussed the virtues of the Japanese farmers in California and 
their contributions to the farming industry, as well as their overall 
earnest efforts to assimilate into this country.118  The concurrence also 
discussed the great racial bigotry that Japanese Americans endured 
during World War II, and the pervasive images that “relate to the alleged 
disloyalty, clannishness, inability to assimilate, racial inferiority and 
racial undesirability of the Japanese, whether citizens or aliens.”119 
Interestingly, compared to Oyama, Chief Justice Vinson’s opinion for 
the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer was much more expansive.  He devoted 
most of the narrative space to a primer on the originations of evolution 
of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.  From the outset, 
the Court questions the validity of a court’s enforcement of a restrictive 
covenant based solely on race.  Unmistakably, the purpose of the 
restrictive covenant was to exclude persons of a designated race from 
purchasing property and occupying it.  Justice Vinson cites to Oyama, 
reflecting on the Court’s finding that a state law denied the equal 
protection of property rights to a designated class of citizens of a 
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specified race and ancestry and thus violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Justice Vinson wrote: 
We have noted that freedom from discrimination by the States in the 
enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objectives sought to 
be effectuated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.  That such 
discrimination has occurred in these cases is clear.  Because of the race or 
color of these petitioners they have been denied rights of ownership or 
occupancy enjoyed as a matter of course by other citizens of different 
race or color.120 
Taken together, would the Shelley and Oyama opinions stand for the 
proposition that African Americans are true Americans, and as such, 
deserve equal treatment and rights, while the Japanese are always 
perceived to be less so?  Could the model minority myth be the modern 
incarnation of the foreignness perception?  Perhaps the myth has even 
supplanted the perpetual foreigner/alien image?  Does the fact that the 
United States has been at war with three major Asian countries in the last 
century affect mainstream America’s perception of Asians and 
Asian Americans in this country?  If so, why?  Regardless of the myriad 
of possible answers, all of the queries should serve to remind us that 
race, citizenship, and immigration have been historically interlinked 
with each other.  Furthermore, as the arguments offered by Huddled 
Masses have shown, these relationships are likely to continue into the 
future, ever changing along with the political and social tides of the time. 
VI.  IMMIGRATION, GENDER, & SEXUAL IDENTITY 
The book’s wide analytical scope is demonstrated by the later 
chapters, where Johnson touches upon gender and sexual identity issues 
and how they relate to the immigration context.  In chapter six, Johnson 
gives an insightful discussion of the treatment of women in U.S. 
immigration history.121  In doing so, he dispels the persistent 
stereotyping of the immigrant as male.  Women have a long documented 
history of immigration to the United States, but unfortunately, many of 
these experiences have been inequitable, and often harsh.  For example, 
Johnson identifies how women were treated as extensions of their 
spouses, removed from any independent legal identity.  He says that the 
status of women in the United States evolved in tandem with their 
treatment under immigration laws.122  As he notes, the subordination of 
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women relative to the status of men began early.  Here, he makes two 
related points:  First, nationality laws allowed a woman to be stripped of 
her U.S. citizenship upon her marriage to an immigrant, since a woman’s 
citizenship was treated as identification to that of her spouse.  Second, 
immigrant women of color were exploited in the low-wage domestic 
labor market.  Frequently, “[s]ingle immigrant women have often 
presumed to be likely to become public charges . . . . [W]omen’s ability to 
immigrate has often turned almost exclusively on their spouses’ income, 
skills, and ability to immigrate.”123 
Johnson proceeds to persuasively illustrate how the prostitute was 
one of the initial groups of criminals targeted by the federal immigration 
laws.  Because many Chinese women were allegedly brought to the 
United States to engage in the sex trade in the late 1800s, Congress began 
to pass a series of laws addressing immigrant prostitution.124  To begin, 
the Alien Prostitution Importation Act of 1875 outlawed the importation 
of immigrant women for prostitution.  Next, the Page Law targeted 
Chinese prostitutes.  In 1907, Congress broadened the prostitution 
provisions of the immigration laws to apply to any women seeking to 
enter this country for “immoral purposes.”  The Immigration Act of 1907 
allowed the deportation of any woman or girl found to be practicing 
prostitution.125  Finally, “Congress passed the Mann Act, also known as 
the White Slave Traffic Act, to stop the interstate transportation of 
women, including immigrant women, for prostitution purposes.”126 
In a passage examining the modern trends in immigration law for 
women, Johnson suggests that today the exploitation of immigrant 
women occurs in the workplace, where many undocumented 
immigrants who are unfamiliar with this country’s language and culture 
are particularly vulnerable.  These immigrant women often work 
extremely long hours for low wages, without benefits, and this practice 
continues into the modern era.  Here, the author refers to the manner in 
which immigrant women have been the subject of gender-specific attacks 
in the political process.  Johnson asserts that “[g]ender-based political 
attacks on immigrant women include critiques of high fertility races and 
allegations that they seek free medical assistance in childbirth and 
automatic U.S. citizenship for their children.”127  Further, this kind of 
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anti-immigration rhetoric has interjected the political debate over 
immigration and welfare reform, albeit against immigrants.128 
In chapter seven, Johnson details the exclusion of lesbians and gay 
men.129  Homosexuals were legally barred from immigrating to the 
United States from 1953 until 1990.130  Over and over, the Supreme Court 
rejected constitutional challenges to the classification of homosexuals 
attempting to enter this country as “psychopathic personalities,” leading 
lives of “sexual deviation.”131  However, mirroring society’s sense of the 
unfairness of these laws, the courts began to uncover loopholes in the 
grounds on which homosexuals were excluded and deported.  For 
example, in 1990, Congress repealed homosexual exclusion in response 
to political activism and social awareness of the rights of lesbians and 
gays.  Referring to the changes in immigration laws in accordance with 
the acceptance of gays in the United States, Johnson cites to Romer v. 
Evans,132 wherein the Supreme Court “invalidated a Colorado law that 
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.”133  For Johnson, Evans 
signals a turnabout, which aligns itself with this changing view of 
homosexuality.134  In Evans, the Court rejected the Colorado Anti-Gay 
Rights Amendment as unconstitutional, on the grounds that the statute 
failed the rational basis test, on which the appellant bore the burden of 
proof.135  The Court reasoned that the Amendment did not bear a 
rational relationship to any legitimate state interest because “its sheer 
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the 
amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class 
it affects.”136  At this same time, the lesbian and gay community, along 
with openly homosexual politicians, continued to decry sexual 
orientation-based discrimination.  Johnson declares his broad 
explanation for the liberalization of immigration laws toward lesbians 
and gays, stating that “[i]n the end, Congress owed its ability to remove 
the homosexual exclusion from the immigration laws to the country’s 
changing political landscape.”137 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Overall, Huddled Masses is well-written and often provocative.  
Johnson’s contribution is valuable for providing the requisite 
information to serve as the basis for a well-informed dialogue about the 
inherent privileges of being an American and the historical roots and 
contemporary sustenance of anti-immigration fervor.  In particular, 
Johnson’s book provides extremely valuable threads of analysis, which 
other Critical Race Theory scholars can weave into intricate mosaics to 
demonstrate the relationships between civil rights and immigration.  
Undoubtedly, the casual reader and scholar will not be disappointed 
with Johnson’s in-depth study. 
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